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A STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
BAIL IN NEW YORK CITY'
INTRODUCTION
The objective of the bail system is to grant pre-trial freedom to
those defendants whose appearance in court can be compelled by a
financial sanction. The purposes of this study are, first, to analyze and
evaluate the methods by which bail and the related device of release
on one's own recognizance 2 attempt to achieve their objective; and,
second, to examine the effects of the bail system on the criminal de-
fendant, by studying the conditions of detention for defendants who do
not obtain pre-trial release and by comparing bail and prison cases
in terms of results at the grand jury, trial and sentencing stages and in
terms of length of time between initiation and disposition of the case.
Serious overcrowding in New York City detention prisons sug-
gested the need for an inquiry into the efficacy of the bail system in
that city. This, plus the -cooperative attitude of city authorities and
the accessibility of statistical data in New York account for the locale
of the study. The focus, in consequence, is on New York problems.
However, in their broad outlines, these problems probably are typical
of those created in other large cities by attempts to resolve, by means
of the bail system, the conflict between the goal of protecting the
freedom of persons not proven guilty and the need to secure their
appearance for judicial proceedings. The belief that a New York study
is relevant to other large cities is strengthened by the similarity of the
1. Research for the study was done by George J. Alexander, Melvin D. Glass,
M. Patrick King, James S. Palermo, John W. Roberts, and Allen G. Schwartz,
students at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Frederic M. Reuss, LL. B.
University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1957, member, New York Bar. This report
was written by John W. Roberts and James S. Palermo with the assistance of other
members of the research group.
The authors wish to thank the many city officials, judges, lawyers, prison per-
sonnel, bondsmen, and prisoners for their assistance. Especial thanks are due to
Mrs. Anna M. Kross, New York City Commissioner of Correction; District Attorneys
Frank S. Hogan of New York County, Frank O'Connor of Queens County, and Daniel
Sullivan of Bronx County; Chief City Magistrate John M. Murtagh and City Magis-
trates Edward J. Chapman and Larry M. Vetrano; and Mr. Anthony Principe,
Director of Operations, New York City Department of Correction, Warden Henry J.
Noble and Deputy Wardens Morris Osofsky and Milton Roth.
2. In New York the form of pre-trial release referred to elsewhere as "release on
one's own recognizance" is called "parole." See text and notes at notes 86-96 infra.
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problems found in New York to those encountered in Philadelphia
where the only other recent comprehensive study of bail has been made.'
Method
The study focuses on defendants charged with felonies be-
cause time limitations precluded extensive coverage of misdemeanor
prosecutions. Information relevant to felony prosecutions was readily
available in the docket books kept by the district attorneys in the
various counties in New York City. To obtain similar information
on misdemeanors, which form a much larger share of the criminal
prosecutions in the city, would require individual examination of the
thousands of sets of court papers kept on file by the court of special
sessions, which has jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases. The statistical
sample of 3,223 actions is composed of approximately one-half of the
felony prosecutions for 1956 in each of the counties of New York,
Bronx and Queens.4  Kings County (Borough of Brooklyn) was
omitted because, for the purposes of this study, the docket book there
does not record sufficient appropriate information, and Richmond
County (Staten Island) was omitted because of the small number of
felony prosecutions there.' Cases in which indictments had been
handed down but the defendant had not yet been apprehended and
cases considered by the grand jury on its own initiative in which no
bills were returned (and consequently the subject of the inquiry was
never taken into custody) were not considered because they have no
bearing on the problems of bail administration. Merged indictments
were taken as one action. Cases in which more than one defendant was
named in the indictment were taken as separate actions as to each
defendant. Where the indictment charged the commission of more
than one crime, the crime named in the first count, which usually is
the most serious, was used to identify the action. Where no bill was
returned, the crime named in the complaint was used to identify the
action.
In addition to compiling the statistical data, the researchers inter-
viewed a group of eighty-nine trial prisoners in the Manhattan House
of Detention for Men (the Tombs), the New Brooklyn Adolescent
Remand Shelter and the Women's House of Detention. This group
3. Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadel-
phia, 102 U. PA. L. Ri . 1031 (1954).
4. The total number of 1956 felony actions in New York County was 3,795, in
the Bronx 1,383, and in Queens County 1,142, making a grand total of 6,320.
5. 143 felony cases were held to answer by the magistrates' courts in Richmond
County in 1956. CITY MAGISTRAMYS' CouRTs CrrY or Nsw YoRx, ANN UAL RroRT
FoR 1956, at 107-09 (1957).
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was made up of prisoners whose bail amount was $2500 or less and
who had been in prison more than fourteen days. The primary purpose
of these interviews was to learn the reasons why prisoners whose bail
did not appear on its face to be prohibitively high did not obtain
release. The interviews also elicited information suggestive of the
prisoners' understanding of the bail system and their attitudes toward
it.6
First hand knowledge of the operation of the detention prisons
was gained by having each of the seven researchers work for three
weeks as a uniformed New York City correction officer. In this
capacity, the researchers divided their time among the Manhattan
House of Detention, the New Brooklyn Adolescent Remand Shelter,
the Brooklyn House of Detention (Raymond Street Jail), the Queens
House of Detention, and the Bronx House of Detention, the institu-
tions which house male trial prisoners in New York City.
Additional information was obtained through courtroom obser-
vation and interviews with judges, defense lawyers, district attorneys,
bondsmen, Correction Department personnel, clerks, Legal Aid Society
personnel, and others associated with the administration of the criminal
law in New York City.
BAIL-SETTING PRACTICES
The Right to Bail
Two distinct propositions are sometimes confused in referring
to the "right to bail." The first is that there is an absolute right to
have bail set in all non-capital cases before conviction. The second
is that the amount of bail must not be excessive. The first of these
rights has, from the time of the First Congress, continuously been
secured in the federal courts, originally by statute 7 and presently by
rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states, "A
person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be admitted
to bail." 8 In most states this right is secured by a constitutional
6. The interviews were conducted between July 17 and August 9, 1957. The
sample consists of 75% of all defendants in the three institutions who fell within the
stated category during that period. The particular subjects were selected at random
from those whose commitment papers indicated that they fell within the category.
Interviews were conducted in the barber shops or day rooms of the cell blocks. The
selection process was explained to each subject and they were told that they were
not required to consent to be interviewed. Four prisoners chose not to be interviewed.
The eighty-nine who participated were very cooperative and seemed to be forthright
in their answers. The interviews lasted from twenty to thirty minutes. The prisoner
and one interviewer talked informally with each other while another interviewer re-
corded relevant data. Inconsistent questions were asked to test credibility. The inter-
viewers believe the responses herein published are reasonably credible.
7. 1 STrAT. 91 (1789).
8. See Foote, supra note 3. Comment, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 389 (1951).
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provision, stating in substance that all non-capital cases shall be bailable
before conviction,' which provisions have been construed to mean
that bail in such cases is a matter of right.10 The United States Consti-
tution and the New York Constitution have no such provisions."
The second right, that bail not be excessive, is protected against federal
encroachment by the eighth amendment which states, in the same words
as the English Bill of Rights, "excessive bail shall not be required," "
and against state encroachment by parallel provisions in most state
constitutions.' In New York, this provision is contained in article 1,
section 5 of the constitution.
It has sometimes been suggested that the constitutional right that
bail not be excessive implies the existence of a right to be admitted to
bail in all non-capital criminal cases.' 4 The point has never been
litigated as to the United States Constitution because while that in-
strument itself does not speak to the issue, there has always been a
federal statute or rule of court guaranteeing admission to bail in all
such cases.' 5 However, a United States Supreme Court decision
holding that the eighth amendment does- not confer a right to be
admitted to bail in deportation cases appears to support the cbnclusion
that in any federal case this right is purely statutory." In New York,
9. E.g., Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 29; N.J. CoNsT. art. 1, para. 11.
10. E.g., Sioux Falls v. Marshall, 48 S.D. 378, 204 N.W. 999 (1925) ; Cf. State v.
Biehl, 136 N.J.L. 82, 54 A,2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
11. The constitutions of nine states do not contain this provision: Georgia, Maine
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Virginia,
and West Virginia. However, all of these states have constitutional provisions
against excessive bail. In Maine, the constitution provides that no person accused of
a capital offense shall be admitted to bail. Ma. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10. In that state and
in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the right to bail in non-capital cases is clearly
conferred by statute. MZ Ri. S'Ar. ANN. c. 126, § 17 (1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS
c. 276, § 42 (1956); N. HAmp. Rzv. STiA'. ANN. c. 597, § 1 (1953). In Maryland a
statute provides that trial magistrates shall take from the accused his recognizance
with sufficient surety conditioned upon his appearance in court to answer such charges,
and in default of the accused entering into such recognizance the magistrate shall
commit him to jail. MD. ANN. CODE art. 52, § 13(b) (1951). The scope of the right to
bail under this statute appears not to have been litigated. In Georgia, a statute pro-
viding that all non-capital felonies are bailable, GA. CODE ANN. § 27:901 (1953), has
been construed by the Georgia Supreme Court as granting a right to bail in all non-
capital crimes. Newsome v. Scott, 151 Ga. 639, 107 S.E. 854 (1921). Statutes in
New York, North Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia permit discretionary denial
of bail in felony cases. N.Y. CoDm Ctim. PRoc. § 553; N.C. GtN. STrA. § 15-102
(1953). The validity of such a statute appears to have been litigated only in New
York. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-88, 89 to 19-90 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6152.
See text at note 17 infra.
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
13. E.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 33.
14. See United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1926) (dictum).
15. See text and notes at notes 7 and 8 supra.
16. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). In this case enemy aliens who were
detained pending final determination on deportation and who were denied bail by
the Attorney General under the Internal Security Act, contended that their rights under
the eighth amendment had been violated. In rejecting this contention Reed, J., writing
for the Court, stated: "The contention is also advanced that the Eighth Amendment to
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which, in common with the federal government but unlike most states,
has no specific constitutional grant of the right to be admitted to
bail, the Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City
Prison 7 upheld the constitutionality of a statute, section 553 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, which makes bail a matter of right in
misdemeanor cases but discretionary in felony cases. Article 1, section
5 of the New York Constitution was read narrowly to prohibit ex-
cessive bail only and not to prohibit the complete denial of bail in
felony cases at the sound discretion of the court.
Denial of bail under this statute is not appealable and may be
reviewed only by habeas corpus proceedings) But the court's dis-
cretion to deny bail has been strictly construed. With one possible
exception, 9 denial has been upheld by appellate courts only where
defendant had previously fled from criminal prosecution; 'o denial has
the Constitution... compels the allowance of bail in a reasonable amount... . The
bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. In
England that clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but
merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to
grant bail. When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said
that indicated any different concept .... The Eighth Amendment has not prevented
Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this coun-
try. Thus in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death.
Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable.
We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be
allowed under the circumstances of these cases." Id. at 544-46.
In a vigorous dissent, Black, J. wrote: "The amendment is thus [by the interpreta-
tion adopted by the majority] reduced below the level of a pious admonition. Maybe
the literal language of the framers lends itself to this weird, devitalizing interpreta-
tion when scrutinized with a hostile eye. But at least until recently, it has been
the judicial practice to give a broad, liberal interpretation to those provisions of the
Bill of Rights obviously designed to protect the individual from governmental oppres-
sion. I would follow that practice here. The Court refuses to do so because (1) the
English Bill of Rights 'has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases
. . .' and (2) 'in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be
death.' As to (1): The Eighth Amendment is in the American Bill of Rights of
1789, not the English Bill of Rights of 1689. And it is well known that our Bill of
Rights was written and adopted to guarantee Americans greater freedom than had
been enjoyed by their ancestors who had been driven from Europe by persecution...
As to (2) : It is true bail has frequently been denied in this country 'when the punish-
ment may be death.' I fail to see where the Court's analogy between deportation and
the death penalty advances its argument unless it is also analogizing the offense of,
indoctrinating talk to the crime of first degree murder." Id. at 556-57. Justices Frank-
furter, Douglas, and Burton also dissented.
17. 290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498 (1943).
18. Ibid.
19. In People ex tel. Fraser v. Britt, 289 N.Y. 614, 43 N.E.2d 836 (1942), the
Court of Appeals affirmed, without opinion, the denial of a petition for habeas corpus
brought on behalf of a defendant under indictment for abortion and manslaughter.
The report does not indicate the reason for denial.
20. E.g., People ex tel. Greenan v. Devoe, 307 N.Y. 691, 120 N.E.2d 861 (1954);
People v. Mott, 97 Misc. 86, 162 N.Y. Supp. 272 (Sup. Ct. 1916). In Greenan, .mpra
defendant had been a fugitive from the time of the finding of the indictment until
two and one-half years later when he was found living under another name in another
part of the state. In that case the validity of the denial of bail in a non-capital case
was also challenged under the United States.Constitution. The New York court held
that the denial under the New York statute did not deprive the defendant of due
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not been upheld, even in the case of a serious crime, where this factor
has not been present.2 In Shapiro, where the defendant was under
indictment for extortion, the district attorney showed, at a hearing on
the bail application, that the defendant had a record of seven convic-
tions; that while free on bail pending appeal after one of them, he had
failed to appear, remaining a fugitive for one year; and that if convicted
in the present case, he would be subject to life imprisonment as a
fourth felony offender. The Court of Appeals affirmed denial of bail.
The view taken by the Court of Appeals in Shapiro is supported
both by the plain meaning and the historical background of article 1,
section 5. In England the enactment of the Bill of Rights in 1689
which prohibited excessive bail ' was not regarded as enlarging the
class of cases in which bail might be allowed.3 The cases which were
bailable continued to be governed by the Statute of Westminster the
First, which in 1275 had grouped prisoners in two categories; in one
category bail was a matter of right, in the other (which included some
prisoners held for non-capital crimes) bail was not allowed.2" Neither
did the First Congress, which adopted the eighth amendment, regard it
as extending the right to bail to all non-capital crimes, for that same
Congress felt it necessary to include in the Judiciary Act specific
legislation directed at achieving that purpose. 5 The identical words
in the New York Constitution probably were not expected to have any
different effect than they had had in the Bill of Rights and in the
eighth amendment.
Although the decision upholding the constitutionality of section
553 does not, therefore, appear improper, the desirability of such a
limitation is subject to doubt. Appellate review is not likely to provide
satisfactory protection against arbitrary denial of bail. The harm
caused by such a denial may be irremediable by the time a reversal is
obtained. This, in addition to the cost involved in bringing the
appeal, may deter defendants from seeking reviev of bail denials.
Therefore, there is no effective guaranty that appellate court standards
process of law nor abridge his privileges and immunities under the fourteenth amend-
ment. In Mott, supra defendant left the country after becoming the subject of a
criminal investigation and did not return voluntarily after learning that he had been
indicted.
21. E.g., People ex rel. Rupoli v. McDonnell, 277 App. Div. 74, 98 N.Y.S.2d 182
(2d Dep't 1950).
22. 1 WM. & MARY 2, c. 2, § 1.
23. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
24. 3 EDv. 1, c. 15. For a discussion of this statute, which controlled the adminis-
tration of bail in England for about 600 years, see I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW Or ENGLAND 233 (1883).
25. See text and notes at notes 7 and 15 supra.
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for denial of bail will be observed by magistrates and trial judges. 28
The resulting possibility that some abuses will go uncorrected may
have been justified in earlier times-when primitive communications
made successful flight from the jurisdiction relatively easy-in order
to maintain a hold on those defendants who appeared likely to flee.
However, modem police methods and rapid communications have so
reduced the difficulty of apprehending fugitives that the restriction
imposed by the New York statute now appears to be needless. The
federal government and other states apparently have been satisfied
that granting bail as of right in all non-capital cases does not impair
the efficient prosecution of criminal cases. It is to be doubted that
there is any uniqueness in the New York law enforcement situation
sufficient to justify that state's failure to achieve the more liberal
position adopted in other jurisdictions. It is therefore suggested
that action be taken, either by way of constitutional amendment or
legislation, to extend the right to bail to all non-capital cases.
Magistrates' Jurisdiction To Admit to Bail
In addition to the basic limitation upon the right to bail discussed
above, statutes prohibit the magistrate from admitting to bail many
defendants who have criminal records. This limitation is probably of
greater practical significance since the discretionary power to deny
bail in felony cases apparently is seldom exercised. Section 552 (a)
of the Criminal Code requires that prior to admission to bail every
person arrested on a felony charge or for any of a list of specified
misdemeanors and offenses 2 be fingerprinted, that his previous criminal
26. An attempt to remove from office a magistrate who had arbitrarily denied bail
was unsuccessful. American Civil Liberties Union v. McAdoo, 229 App. Div. 511, 242
N.Y. Supp. 696 (1st Dep't 1930).
27. This impression was voiced by Judge McAvoy of the supreme court, dis-
senting in American Civil Liberties Union v. McAdoo, supra note 26: "The common
practice-even in major felony charges, 'infamous crimes,' after indictment-is to
admit defendants to bail in practically all cases, excepting murder in the first degree,
and no reason appears here for disregarding this custom and usage." Id. at 514, 242
N.Y. Supp. at 699. One assistant district attorney of New York County, who has
had considerable experience as a prosecutor in the magistrates' courts states that the
magistrates ordinarily grant bail in all cases in which they have power to do so. Data
from which the statistics used in this study were compiled did not reveal whether
failure to grant bail was discretionary or compelled by the prohibition against
magistrates' granting bail in certain cases under § 552 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
28. The misdemeanors and offenses specified in § 552 are: (1) using, carrying,
or possessing burglar's instruments; (2) buying or receiving stolen property; (3) un-
lawful entry; (4) aiding escape from prison; (5) jostling (pick-pocketing); (6)
loitering in a public place soliciting men for the purpose of committing an unnatural
act or other lewdness; (7) carnal abuse of a child; (8) impairing health or morals
of a minor; (9) a violation of any of the thirteen sections of article 106 of the penal
law, entitled "Indecency"; (10) sodomy as a misdemeanor; (11) rape as a misde-
meanor; (12) sale or possession of ampetrine or its derivatives; (13) sale or
possession of hypodermic needles or syringes; (14) any violation (as a misdemeanor)
of the Narcotic Drug Control Act.
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record, if any, as shown by local police department files, be obtained,
and that this record be submitted to the person empowered to admit
him to bail.2" If in such cases the record indicates that the defendant
has been convicted previously of a felony or twice convicted of any of
the specified misdemeanors or of any two of them, section 552 provides
that he may not be admitted to bail by a magistrate, but only by a
judge of the county court or the court of general sessions or by a justice
of the supreme court.3" In order to have bail fixed in such cases,
application must be made to one of these higher courts.
TABLE 1. INITIAL BAIL SETTING
Bail Set Bail Denied
Initially Initially
Total Number of Number of
County cases cases Per cent cases Per cent
Bronx 663 545 82.2 118 17.8
New York 1,917 1,373 71.6 544 28.4
Queens 556 466 83.8 90 16.2
Total 3,136 2,384 76.0 752 24.0
This section has the effect of denying bail initially to a substantial
proportion of defendants, as Table 1 shows. The 3,136 actions included
in that table are all of the actions in the sample except for 88 in which
bail was never set because the defendants were immediately released on
their own recognizance. In 2,384, or 76 per cent, bail was set at or
before the defendant's initial appearance in court-in actions begun
by complaint, at appearance before a magistrate, and in cases begun
in the grand jury, at arraignment on the indictment in county court
29. If the defendant is acquitted or dismissed his fingerprints and all copies are
required to be returned to him or destroyed in his presence. N.Y. CoD4 CRIM. PROC.
§ 552 (a). For a discussion of the problem of returning fingerprints, see Comment,
106 U. PA. L. Rzv. 303 (1957).
30. In each of the five counties of New York City, except New York County
(Manhattan), a county court has jurisdiction over felony cases. N.Y. CODM CRIM. PROC.
§ 39. In New York County the court of equivalent jurisdiction is the court of general
sessions. Id. § 51.
A court of special sessions for the entire city of New York has jurisdiction over
misdemeanor cases. N.Y.C. CRim. CTs. Acr § 31. The supreme court is a court of
general jurisdiction, id. § 22, but it rarely exercises its criminal jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by § 552, a justice of the court of special
sessions of the city of New York may admit to bail any defendant charged with a
misdemeanor in that court. N.Y. Cone CRIm. PROC. § 552. Section 552 also prohibits
a magistrate from admitting to bail any defendant charged with a crime punishable
by death or with inflicting probably fatal injury on another in circumstances which,
should death ensue, the crime charged would be murder. Ibid.
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or general sessions. 1 Inasmuch as the discretionary power to deny
bail in any felony case appears rarely to be exercised either by magis-
trates or county court and general sessions judges," it may be assumed
that the vast majority of the 752 defendants who make up the remaining
24 per cent were not admitted to bail because they were not bailable
by magistrates under section 552.
Of these 752, only 115, or 15 per cent were ultimately admitted
to bail.m Some few of those never admitted to bail may have sub-
sequently made bail applications which were denied in the courts'
discretion. By far the greater number of defendants, however, prob-
ably did not apply, many because they believed they would be unable
to furnish any bail that might be set, others for non-financial reasons. 4
A few cases of non-application may be attributable to ignorance of the
law and inadequate legal representation. When a magistrate refrains
from setting bail because he lacks power to do so under section 552,
he ordinarily informs the defendant that he is not "bailable." Unless
acquainted with his rights by a lawyer, the defendant may not realize
that this means simply that he is not bailable by a magistrate, but that
the county court or general sessions and supreme courts are empowered
to grant him bail under such circumstances. It may be assumed that
the defendant who has private counsel zealously striving to protect all
of his interests will be more likely to apply to have bail fixed than will
the defendant represented by Legal Aid, which, because of its heavy
work load is unable to devote as much attention to each client. 5
The authors of this study believe that section 552 places an un-
warranted restriction on the power of New York City magistrates to
fix bail. The purpose of this restriction is not clear. Inasmuch as
it usually causes a delay in admission to bail, the thought behind the
section may be that persons who fall within its proscription are likely
to be connected with unsolved crimes or to have warrants lodged against
them in other places and that the police should have additional time
31. Occasionally bail is set upon application to a magistrate or judge prior to the
defendant's first appearance in court.
32. See text and note at note 27 supra.
33. It should be noted that the sampling is of actions, not of defendants. Conse-
quently, if the same person were named in more than one indictment in 1956 and the
indictments were not merged, it would be possible for that person to appear more
than once in the sample. If such a person were unable to furnish the bail which had
been fixed in one case and were to be denied bail in another case it is unlikely that
he would apply to have bail fixed in the latter case.
34. See Table 3 ijnfra and text following.
35. Defendants unable to hire private counsel are represented by the Legal Aid
Society in New York County, by Legal Aid and court appointed counsel in the Bronx
and by members of the Queens County Bar Association in Queens.
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in which to investigate in these cases." It is possible that in some
few cases this delay may result in acquisition by the police of informa-
tion justifying considerably higher bail than would have been set on
initial appearance before the magistrate. This hypothetical advantage,
however, seems insufficient to outweigh the very real inconvenience
the law causes to the large number of defendants who fall within its
sweep. Furthermore, if delay is the purpose of section 552, it might
better be cast in the form of a postponement of bail setting for a
definite time. As written, delay is an incidental result. Ultimately,
the purpose of the section seems to come down to a lack of confidence
in the ability of the magistrates to fix bail in certain cases. Perhaps
in some areas of the state this lack of confidence is justified. In New
York City, however, it is incongruous. Magistrates there receive
$16,000 per year and all are required to be lawyers.3 7 As a result,
the magistrates' courts are staffed by qualified men and women who are
well able to set bail in any case which might come before them. Also,
the testimony of witnesses, arresting officers and the defendant taken
at the initial hearing, if one is held, may provide the magistrate with
an insight into the personality of the defendant and the background
from which he comes which the higher court judge hearing a bail
application may not have."8 In many cases, therefore, the magistrate
is better qualified to set bail. Once it is posited that some judicial
officer will fix bail, there seems to be no compelling reason to deprive
well qualified magistrates of the power to fix bail simply because the
defendant has a criminal record of a particular type.
This study recommends the enactment of an amendment to section
552 to except New York City magistrates from its operation. Such
an amendment was passed by the legislature in 1949, 1954, 1955, 1956
and 1957' 9 but each time it was vetoed by Governors Dewey or
Harriman, who in no instance filed an opinion to support their action. 40
36. Admission to bail in any felony case may be delayed if the district attorney
avails himself of § 560, N.Y. CODE CGIM. PROc., requiring notice to the district attorney
two days prior to making application for bail.
37. N.Y.C. Clmf. CTs. AcT. § 82.
38. Many bail applications in general sessions are ex parte, and, according to Mr.
Roger Craig, Chief Assistant Clerk of General Sessions, they often are heard in
chambers. Interview, New York City, July 9, 1957.
39. The 1957 proposal was in the N.Y. State Legislature Assembly Bill No.
2597, Senate Bill No. 2556 (1957).
40. The desire to delay bail setting probably accounts for the vetoes. In response to
a letter to Governor Harriman inquiring as to his reasons for vetoing the amendment,
Mr. Daniel Gutman, Counsel to the Governor, wrote, "It is apparent that prisoners
are afforded ample opportunity to apply for and have bail fixed. The major portion
of our law enforcement authorities are of the opinion that the advantage of permitting
an earlier fixing of bail by magistrates is outweighed by the disadvantage of removing
safeguards that presently surround the fixing of bail." (Emphasis added.) Letter,
Dec. 2, 1957, on file in the Biddle Law Library.
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The amendment had the support of the New York City magistrates.4
The interests of the prosecution were protected by the proviso that the
district attorney or an assistant district attorney must be present in
court and have an opportunity to be heard in order for the magistrate
to admit to bail a defendant charged with any of the crimes or offenses
enumerated in section 552.1
The Source of Bail
The purpose of bail is to compel appearance by economic pressure.
If bail deters flight, it is because the defendant is unwilling to forfeit
his own money or is unwilling to have friends or relatives who have
"bailed him out" forfeit their money. Whether the loss will fall
directly upon the defendant or upon a friend or relative depends upon
the manner in which bail is furnished." If a defendant who fails to
appear has deposited his own cash, securities or realty bond, the
financial loss falls on him. This will also be the case if a professional
bondsman has written a bond for the defendant and is able to recover
from him on an express or implied contract of indemnification 44 by
levying either on collateral the defendant has supplied or on other
property of the defendant. If a friend or relative supplies the cash,
securities or realty bond or agrees to indemnify the bondsman, the
friend or relative bears the risk of the defendant's non-appearance. In
New York City, almost all bail is given in the form of surety company
41. Interview with City Magistrate Larry M. Vetrano, Director of Administration,
Magistrates' Courts, City of New York, July 9, 1957.
42. See note 28 supra.
43. Bail may be given by the bond of a fidelity or surety company. N.Y. CoD4 Clm.
PRoc. §§ 557-a, 557-b. A realty bond may be given if the real estate is worth at least
twice the bail amount, exclusive of all liens. Id. § 569. Cash, United States government
bonds, United States treasury certificates or notes, corporation bonds guaranteed un-
conditionally as to principal and interest by the United States Government or bonds
of the State of New York may be deposited in lieu of bail. Id. § 586.
44. There is an implied agreement that the defendant will indemnify the surety if
the surety is obliged to pay because of the defendant's failure to appear. Badolato
v. Molinari, 106 Misc. 342, 174 N.Y. Supp. 512 (Sup. Ct. 1919). Early cases in other
jurisdictions had held that such an agreement, express or implied, was void as against
public policy. The theory of those cases was that the bondsman becomes the de-
fendant's jailor, that the government seeks the presence of the defendant rather than
the amount of money represented by the bail bond, and that to permit the surety to
indemnify himself would destroy the incentive to produce the defendant. Dunkin v.
Hodge, 46 Ala. 523 (1871); Ratcliffe v. Smith, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 172 (1877). Con-
sistently with this theory, cash could not be deposited by the defendant as or in lieu
of bail at common law. See Badolato v. Molinari, mipra. It is now permitted by
statute in New York. Note 43 supra. The substitute jailor theory does not prevail in
New York, as stated by the court in Moloney v. Nelson, 158 N.Y. 351, 355, 53 N.E.
31, 32-33 (1899), "It is the loss of the money deposited, or the assurance that the
sureties will be obliged to pay the amount of the bail, that is relied upon to secure the
presence of the accused. It, therefore, cannot be said to be a part of the public policy
of this state to insist upon personal liability of sureties, for there need not be such
personal liability in any case if the accused make a deposit of money in lieu of bail as
provided by the statute." See also Leahy v. United States, 224 U.S. 567, 575 (1912).
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bonds written by professional bondsmen as attorneys in fact for the
surety companies. In New York County, for example, no realty
bonds were posted in 1956. In the event of a forfeiture, the surety
company will pay the bail amount to the court. The bondsman, in
turn, is contractually bound to indemnify the surety company. The
surety company requires each of its bondsman representatives to
maintain with it a substantial reserve fund upon which it draws as
forfeitures occur. If this fund falls below a certain level, the company
will not permit the bondsman to write any more bonds until he re-
plenishes it. For his own protection the bondsman will usually either
require collateral security or proof of sufficient financial responsibility
to insure that, in the event of a forfeiture, he will be recompensed by
the defendant or a third-party indemnitor.
The eight bondsmen who were formally interviewed for this
study all reported that they write bonds only where there is a guarantor
who has assets equal to or greater than the bail amount. Apparently
there is considerable flexibility as to the nature of the assets required,
although savings accounts are favored. Other bondsmen encountered
informally in and around the courts also affirmed the existence of this
practice, but one stated that occasional exceptions are made when the
defendant has "strong ties in the city and a good record." To the same
effect was the testimony of Mr. Abraham Newman (at the time a
licensed bondsman in New York City) before the Senate Subcommittee
on Improvements in the Federal Criminal Law of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the 84th Congress. 45 This practice may be peculiar to
New York City. The Philadelphia bail study did not disclose any
evidence of its existence in that city.46
Determination of Bail Amount
The practice of setting bail individually for each defendant pre-
sumably is based on the view that the degree of economic coercion
necessary to overcome the temptation to take flight may vary from
defendant to defendant and from case to case. The role of the
magistrate or judge who sets bail, then, is to determine the amount
of bail which will deter the individual defendant. The appellate deci-
sions on excessive bail admonish him to set it no higher.4 The duty of
45. Hearings Before the Senate Subcomnmittee on Improvements in the Federal
Criminal Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1624 (1956).
46. Foote, supra note 3. In Boston a higher rate (10%) is charged for unsecured
bail than for secured bail (5%). See MoNTGomERY, RVXaOr OP THX CLERK Or Tm
IZcoDRR's COURT, CITy or DMOrOr 16, 35 (1952). The Boston rate for secured bail
is comparable to that established by statute in New York. See note 57 infra.
47. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657
(7th Cir. 1926); People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 296 N.Y. 109, 71 N.E.2d 423
(1947).
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performing a very delicate and difficult psychological prognosis is thus
placed on the judge. Since many judges are strongly inclined to
accept the assistant district attorney's bail recommendation, he too
shares in this responsibility.
Improper Use of Bail
It is manifest that bail may be used for an improper purpose-
not to compel appearance, but to incarcerate, either for punishment or
to prevent possible future criminal activity. When this is done, there
is, of course, no attempt to arrive at a bail amount sufficient to deter
flight; bail is set at an amount great enough to preclude release. Some
evidence was obtained that bail is thus improperly used in New York
City. Some magistrates believe, for example, that young persons
accused of crimes should be given "a taste of jail." Recognizing that
they may be acquitted or receive suspended'sentences, they try to set
bail high" enough to insure that the defendants receive "a taste of jail"
prior to trial. In addition, an assistant district attorney in Queens
County reported that his office often recommends bail of $20,000 or
$25,000 for felony narcotics defendants in order to "protect society,"
and that $5,000 bail is often recommended for defendants accused of
receiving stolen property; the high bail, he *said, was requested not
because there was any reason to believe they would not appear, but was
"a manifestation of a public policy to control fences" in order to reduce
the number of burglaries and robberies.4 It is fundamental that the
state has no right to punish a person until his guilt has been established
beyond a reasonable doubt.- And there is no support in the law for the
proposition that a person may be imprisoned because of the speculative
possibility that he may commit a crime.49 Judges and prosecutors,
therefore, should carefully refrain from employing bail to accomplish
these illegal ends. Few cases of excessive bail ever reach the appellate
courts; self-restraint and personal ethics are the only real controls over
improper use of bail.
Relevant Factors in Bail Setting
In determining the amount of bail necessary to deter flight, the
relevant factors are usually stated to be: the nature of the offense, the
weight of the evidence, the character of the defendant and his financial
ability to give bail."' The relevance of the nature of the crime rests
48. Interview, Queens County, Aug. 1, 1957.
49. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 281-83 (2d Cir. 1950). See Foote,
supra note 3, at 1033-34.
50. People ex tel Lobell v. McDonnell, 296 N.Y. 109, N.E.2d 423 (1947);
People ex reL Rothensies v. Searles, 229 App. Div. 603, 243 N.Y. Supp. 15 (3d Dep't
1930). See also F). R. CRim. P. 46(c) ; Foote, mtpra note 3, at n.11.
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on the theory that because the severity of punishment increases with
the seriousness of the crime, the desire to avoid that punishment and,
hence, the likelihood of flight increase in like proportion.5 The force
of this reasoning is diminished by the fact that the likelihood of
zealous pursuit and recapture are also greater in the more serious
crimes. Knowledge of this probably has as great a deterrent effect as
does increased bail. 2 The weight of the evidence is relevant in the
same way and is subject to the same criticism.58
The character of the individual defendant and his financial ability
to give bail appear to be the two factors which should be given the
most weight in determining the bail amount. Predicting whether a
person will appear in court is, of course, an extremely difficult matter.
Studies done in the related field of predicting future criminal behavior
for the purposes of sentencing and parole indicate that only by the
use of elaborate actuarial methods or, perhaps, extensive psychiatric
examination can a reasonable degree of success be expected. 54 Never-
theless, it would appear that the more a judge or magistrate knows
about the strength of a defendant's economic and emotional attachments
in the community the better able he will be to predict his likelihood of
appearance, and thus make an appropriate choice of bail amount. If
the defendant has lived and worked in the same community for a
number of years and is currently employed, if he has a family with
whom he lives, and if he belongs to a church, or to a union or to other
social organizations, he would appear to be a good bail risk, almost
without regard to the nature of the crime. If, on the other hand, he
has no such ties in the city, he would appear a poor bail risk. Informa-
tion of this type is often not available to the magistrate or judge who
sets bail, although some of it may be revealed by the testimony at the
initial hearing. Some magistrates before setting bail attempt to elicit
from the defendant information as to his employment status and
family background. Most, however, do not. The character of the
defendant as a factor in setting bail appears, therefore, to be receiving
less consideration than it should.
This conclusion is borne out by the judgment of the researchers
who interviewed prisoners unable to raise bail. Many of the prisoners
51. See Foote, s'pra note 3, at 1035.
52. See id. at 1036.
53. Ibid.
54. See ALSXANDnR & STAUB, TIIE CRIMINAL, TiE; JuDGE, AND THE PUBLIC
(1931); GLUZCK & GLucK, UNEAV1LLING JuvxNiLn DELINQUENCY (1950); HALL &
GLUmcK; CRImINAL LAW AND ENVORC5MnNT 847-52 (1951); HAWrHAWAY & MONA-
CIiSI, ANALYSING AND PREDICTING JUVENILE DELINQJENCY WITH THE: MMPI (1953) ;
MEHL, CLINICAL AND STATISTICAL PRIEDICTrION (1954); OHLIN, SELE-CTION TOR
PAROLE (1951).
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appeared to the interviewers to have ties in the city sufficiently strong
to make it appear unlikely that they would flee. Of the eighty-nine
interviewed, all but eleven said they had relatives in New York. Seven
indicated they had lived in New York for from two to five years, and
forty-nine said they had lived there over ten years. Six said they
had been living at the same address for from two to five years and
fifteen for more than five years.
The defendant's financial ability to furnish bail is relevant in
conjunction with his character because it is unlikely that a defendant
whose background indicates a reasonable degree of stability will risk
the loss of all his assets or all the assets of his family or friends by
an attempt to avoid prosecution. Thus, although bail is not by law
excessive simply because it is more than the defendant is able to
furnish," but only if it is more than necessary to compel appearance, 56
it would seem that in most cases an amount greater than the defendant
is able to furnish would also be greater than that necessary to deter
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120 78% 215 62% 111 85% 4
100 68% 288 56% 135 69% 5
54 39% 151 56% 41 73% 2
8 37% 40 68% 14 57%
97 26% 229 37% 59 59% 3
68 21% 150 23% 60 35% 2
24 13% 44 16% 1 0%
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467 65% 2,292 49o
The cases included in the above table are those in which the original bail amount
was not later changed. Decreases and increases are treated separately in Tables 10
and 11 infra.
Table 2 shows that at $1500 bail is furnished in 55 per cent of
the cases and at $2000 in 65 per cent of the cases; but when bail is
55. United States v. Rumrich, 180 F.2d 575, 576 (2d Cir. 1950). Cf. Korean Code
art. 98(2), which prohibits the court from fixing bail beyond the financial ability of
the accused.
56. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); United States v. Motlow, 10 F2d 657
(7th Cir. 1926); People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 296 N.Y. 109, 71 N.E.2d 423
(1947).
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fixed at $2500 it is only furnished in 37 per cent of the cases. Even
at $500 only three out of four defendants obtained pre-trial release,
while at $7500 and above only one defendant in seven is able to post
bail. The point at which most defendants cannot post bail is thus at
$2500, an amount which most magistrates and judges would probably
not regard as high. Perhaps what actually happens is that the judge
unconsciously evaluates the defendant's ability to raise bail in terms of
his own financial status and concludes that $1500 or $2500 is a small
amount. To obtain a surety bond in the amount of $1500 the defendant
must pay a premium of $70.00.1" Ordinarily the bondsman will also
require that the defendant or a third-party indemnitor have sufficient
assets to protect the bondsman in the event of a forfeitureY8 Some
officials, in setting bail, may be unaware of this practice, and may set
bail on the assumption that the premium is the only financial obstacle.
In fact, the need to furnish security seems to be the major stumbling
block. The average low-income city dweller works from day to day
with little or no savings or equity in property to fall back upon. He
generally rents an apartment, and his automobile, if he has one, and
furniture may be encumbered. Small savings accounts or reserves in
life insurance policies may be the family's only free assets. But the
lack of property is not necessarily indicative of a lack of personal
responsibility and magistrates should therefore scrutinze carefully the
financial status of the defendant lest poverty itself become a cause of
unequal treatment.
The comparison by counties of the ability to furnish bail presented
in Table 2 indicates that the ability to furnish bail varies by county. In
the Bronx and New York bail was furnished in 45 per cent and 46
per cent of the cases respectively, whereas in Queens it was furnished in
65 per cent of the cases. The variance between Queens and New York
is probably attributable to two factors. First a lower average bail is
set in Queens than in New York. In Queens, 246 of the 467 cases, or
52.7 per cent, had bail set at $1000 or less, whereas in New York only
503 out of 1276 cases, or 39.4 per cent, had bail set at $1000 or less.
This difference is explained in part by the lower incidence in Queens
of narcotics crimes and robbery, in which bail is customarily set higher
than, for example, in forgery, rape or grand larceny cases. A second
factor which probably leads to a higher percentage of Queens defendants
57. The maximum premiums for bail bonds allowed by statute are: 5% on the
first $1,000, with a minimum of $10; 4% on the second $1,000; 3% on the excess over
$2,000. N.Y. CoD4 CRIM. PROC. § 554.
58. See text and note at note 45 supra.
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furnishing bail at any given amount than New York defendants is the
difference in social and economic structure between the two counties.
Queens is made up of many middle class residential neighborhoods and
has fewer depressed areas inhabited by minority groups. As a result,
a defendant in Queens is likely to have access to greater financial re-
sources than a defendant in New York. Bronx County defendants
demonstrate a good ability to give bail relative to New York defendants
at low amounts but a relative inability to do so at higher amounts. This
is not readily explained by any apparent distinctions in the social or
economic characteristics of Bronx County or in the bail setting pattern
there.
The statistics compiled in Table 2 suggest that bail is often set
without sufficient regard to the defendant's financial ability to furnish it.
In no case was a judge or magistrate observed to inquire into this
matter, although defense counsel occasionally make reference to it.59
While financial inability is not the only reason why bail is not furnished,
it is undoubtedly the most important reason. This view is corroborated
by Table 3, which summarizes the reasons given by the eighty-nine
prisoners interviewed, for their failure to furnish bail. Seventeen stated
TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF REASONS GIVEN BY PRISONERS IN DETENTION
FOR FAILURE To Go OUT ON BAIL
Man-
hattan
House of House of
Deten- Brooklyn Deten-tion (Adoles- tion
Financial (Men) cents) (Wo to Total
No money for fee 17 7 4 28
No collateral 11 4 2 17
Money needed by family for other
purposes - 2 - 2
Preferred to use money to hire
lawyer 4 - - 4
Bondsman wanted 100% cash - - 1 1
Total 52
59. Two of the researchers visited Magistrates' courts in Brooklyn, the Bronx,
Queens and Manhattan, observing approximately two hundred cases. In addition, the
other researchers frequently visited magistrates' courts and trial courts to observe
the tenor of judicial proceedings, especially with respect to bail setting practices.
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Man-
Non-Financial hattan
House of House of
Warrants lodged against defendants Deten- Brooklyn Deten-
tion (Adoles- tlionfor parole violations or other (Men) cents) (Women) Total
crimes 4 4 3 11
Family decided to leave defendant in
jail - 4 - 4
Family does not believe defendant will
appear if released on bail - 1 - 1
Staying in jail to "kick" narcotics
habit - 4 1 5
Non-residents: no one in New York
to post bail 2 1 1 4
Ashamed to contact family 1 1 - 2
Did not know bail was set at low
amount 2 1 - 3
"Good idea" to stay in jail until trial 1 - 1 2
Afraid that time served is lost when
prisoner goes out on bail.' - 1 - 1
Did not want to bother anyone 2 2 - 4
Total 37
Grand Total 89
that they lacked sufficient collateral to induce a bondsman to write a
bond for them. This reflects the practice of New York bail bondsmen
of requiring substantial security for most bonds."' In addition,
twenty-eight stated they could not even afford the premium on a bond."
Two others reported that their families needed the money for other
purposes and four said that they preferred to use the money for a
lawyer. One female narcotics defendant claimed that several bondsmen
had refused to write a bond for her unless she could supply 100 per cent
cash to secure it.' Thus, financial inability was the reason given by
60. This is a misapprehension. "Any time spent by a person convicted of a crime
in a ... prison or jail prior to his conviction and before sentence has been pronounced
upon him shall become and be calculated as a part of the sentence imposed upon him.
." N.Y. PZI. LAW § 2193.
61. See text and note at note 45 supra.
62. See note 57 supra.
63. If the defendant had had cash equal to the bail amount she could have de-
posited it in lieu of bail and would have had no need for a bondsman. See note 43
supra.
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fifty-two prisoners, 58.4 per cent of those interviewed, for their failure
to go out on bail. Furthermore, the reasons given by some of the
remaining thirty-seven prisoners interviewed might well be rationaliza-
tions, formulated after they had concluded that they could not afford
bail. Especially would this appear possible in the case of the two who
thought it was a "good idea" to spend some time in jail before trial
(they said that they thought judges are more likely to award sus-
pended sentences to prisoners with jail time) " and the four who said
they did not wish to "bother anyone." It is difficult to believe that a
substantial number of the prisoners who do not furnish bail because of
financial inability, could not be deterred by a lower amount, an amount
they might be able to furnish.
TABLE 4. PER CENT OF CASES IN WHICH BAIL WAS FURNISHED,
BY CRIME, ALL BAIL AMOUNTS COMBINED
Number Per Cent
of Who





Dangerous weapon 67 63%
Grand larceny 451 64%
Rape 109 67%
Forgery 98 68%
The ability to raise bail is analyzed by type of crime in Table 4.6
Forgery and rape offenders were the most successful in raising bail,
doing so in 68 per cent and 67 per cent of the cases respectively. Again,
the frequency of setting bail at a low figure is a major factor. 6Y Table
6 infra shows that while in 66 per cent of grand larceny cases bail was set
at $1,000 or less, only 15 per cent of robbery cases were in that group.
64. This theory is not supported by statistics comparing the sentencing treatment
of bail and jail cases. See Table 17 infra.
65. The following crimes are omitted from this table because the samples were
considered too small: homicide (17 cases) ; receiving stolen property (36 cases) ; and
sex crimes other than rape (45 cases).
66. Many rape cases are not as serious as the name of the crime might imply, thus
accounting for the frequency of low bails. A substantial number are statutory rape.
Others are cases which are later reduced to assault. In addition, since New York does
not recognize common-law marriage, a woman living with a man not her husband!
finds that a convenient sanction for settling domestic difficulties lies in initiating at
prosecution for rape. judges and prosecutors apparently realize this, and many such?
cases are dismissed when the reconciliation is effected.
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TABLE 5. ABILITY To FURNISH BAIL, A COMPARISON AMONG
SELECTED CRIMES AT SELECTED AMOUNTS
Burglary Average
Bail "White Collar" and for All
Amount Crimes Robbery Crimes
$500 79% 67% 72%
$1000 69% 47% 62%
$1500 50% 42% 55%
$2500 42% 22% 37%
$5000 34% 17% 25%
"White collar" crimes included in the above table include forgery,
grand larceny and receiving stolen property.
Table 5 shows an inherent difference in ability to furnish bail at
any given amount by type of crime. The "white collar" " defendants
were able to post bail consistently in a higher percentage of cases than
persons accused of burglary or robbery. As might be expected, the
"white collar" defendants are thus shown to be from more favorable
economic circumstances than those accused of burglary or robbery.
While the character of the individual defendant and his financial
ability to give bail appear to be given less consideration in setting bail
than they merit, an inordinate degree of importance seems to be attached
to the nature of the offense. It has been held improper under the
United States Constitution to determine bail amount solely by reference
to the type of crime." Nevertheless, one city magistrate purports to
adhere consistently to a policy of requiring a minimum of $1,000 bail
in drunken driving cases, without regard to factors which might make
a lower amount appropriate in a particular case. And another
magistrate maintains a check list of all the major crimes showing bail
amounts for each. In addition, an assistant district attorney in Queens
County reported that his office pursues a policy of recommending a bail
amount based on the type of crime charged. 9 Some amounts for first
offenders he mentioned for certain crimes follow:
Robbery: $10,000.
Felonious assault: $2,500.
Forgery: $2,500, if of an official record or document. (In other
cases bail would vary with the amount involved.)
Rape: In the first degree, $2,500.
67. The "white collar" crimes on this table are receiving stolen goods, grand
larceny and forgery.
68. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
69. Interview, Queens County, Aug. 1, 1957.
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Carnal abuse of a child: $2,500.
Possession of a dangerous weapon: $1,000 to $1,500.
Sodomy: $2,500. (But the amount will vary with the age of the
victim; if the victim is a small child, the bail is higher.)
Receiving stolen goods: $5,000.
Felonious possession of narcotics: $20,000 to $25,000.
It was stated that these amounts are sometimes varied depending
upon the background of the individual defendant. Table 6 for Queens
County shows that of the cases studied, bail was usually set at a figure
considerably lower than the recommended amount in many of the
crimes listed.70
TABLE 6. PER CENT OF BAILS SET AT PARTicULAR AMOUNTS, BY SELECTED
































































































































70. Robbery: recommended amount, $10,000; bail set at $5,000 or less in 74.1%
of cases. Assault: recommended amount, $2,500; bail set at $1,000 or less in 59.6%
of cases. Receiving stolen property: recommended amount, $5,000; bail set at $2,500 or
less in 86.7% of cases. Narcotics: recommended amount, $20,000 to $25,000; bail set
at $7,500 or more in only 37.5% of cases.
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TABLE 8. Pm CENT OF BAILS SET AT PARTICU.AR AMOUNTS, By SELECTED




























































































































However, tendencies toward high bail in certain crimes and low
bail in certain other crimes are evident in each of the counties and in
Table 6 for the three counties. Taking $1,500 as "high" bail since
at that amount almost half of the defendants are unable to raise bail
(and above that amount it becomes progressively more difficult for
them to do so 7), crimes in which strong tendencies toward high bail
appear are:
Robbery: 85 per cent of cases at $1,500 or higher.
Narcotics: 72 per cent at $1,500 or higher.
Sex crimes other than rape: 68.9 per cent at $1,500 or higher.
Burglary: 64.5 per cent at $1,500 or higher.
Possession of dangerous weapons: 61.2 per cent at $1,500 or
higher.
Crimes in which tendencies toward low bail appear are:
Receiving stolen property: 33.4 per cent at $1,500 or higher.
Grand larceny: 33.8 per cent at $1,500 or higher.
Rape: 33.9 per cent at $1,500 or higher.
Forgery: 34.6 per cent at $1,500 or higher.
71. See Table 2 supra and text following.
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Assault is somewhat equivocal with bail set in 43.1 per cent of the cases
at $1,500 or higher.
These apparent biases do not necessarily mean that magistrates and
judges somnambulistically set high bail for some crimes and low bail
for others, without considering the distinctive elements of each case.
It is possible that a large proportion of those accused of the high bail
crimes have backgrounds justifying serious doubts as to the likelihood
of their appearance, and that the opposite is true of those accused of
the low bail crimes, and thus even after considering the backgrounds
of the individual defendants, the tendencies noted would appear. It is
definitely not the case, however, that defendants in the high bail crimes
are better able to give bail than those in the low bail crimes. 2 Further-
more, the maximum sentences which may be imposed in two of the
low bail crimes are higher than that which may be imposed in one of
the high bail crimes. A person convicted of rape in the first degree
may be sentenced to an indeterminate term the minimum of which is
one day, the maximum of which is life,' and a person convicted of
forgery in the first degree may be sentenced to a term not to exceed
twenty years. 4 On the other hand, upon conviction of selling or trans-
ferring narcotics a person may be sentenced to an indeterminate term
of from five to fifteen years or from seven to fifteen years depending
upon whether the recipient was older or younger than twenty-one.
5
And when the concentrations shown by these statistics are considered
in the light of the fact that magistrates and judges usually lack in-
formation as to the character and financial status of the individual when
they set bail, and usually do not inquire into these matters, the con-
clusion seems justified that there is in fact very little individualization
in bail setting.
More individualization could be achieved if magistrates and judges
were to adopt a policy of inquiring into the defendant's employment,
family, associational and financial background and would reach their
bail determinations in light of the information elicited. This study
also proposes an administrative measure, which, if adopted, should
provide the bail-setting judge with additional reliable information of
this nature and thus result in a more enlightened choice of bail amount.
The proposal is that one week following setting of bail a thorough
investigation of the defendant's background be undertaken for the
72. See Table 5 supra and text following.
73. N.Y. PzN. LAW § 2010.
74. Id. § 886.
75. Id. § 1751. Multiple felony offenders are subject to increased sentences in
New York. N.Y. Priq. LAW §§ 1941-43.
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purpose of revising the bail amount if the defendant consents to this
investigation when suggested by the court. The one week delay would
eliminate the necessity of investigating those defendants able to raise
the bail originally set. In addition to questioning the defendant's
family and employer, others, such as neighbors, co-workers and clergy-
men, would be interviewed. The investigation could be conducted by
the probation officers of the courts involved. On the basis of the
information thus obtained the investigators would decide whether
revision of the bail amount would be advisable. If it appeared to be, they
would submit their recommendation to a judge of the court for which
the man had been held. The judge, although not bound by the sub-
mitted recommendation, should grant it the respect merited by the fact
that it reflected the considered judgment of persons who, in a sense,
would be experts in assessing the reliability of defendants. The in-
vestigation could also form the basis of a recommendation of release
on the defendant's recognizance pending trial, if the investigators
thought the man so reliable that no economic coercion was needed to
compel his appearance.7
TABLE 10. NUMBER OF BAIL CASES IN WHICH THE ORIGINAL BAIL
AMOUNT WAS LATER REDUCED, BY COUNTY
All cases Number
in which % of who %o who
bail was total then posted posted
County set Reductions cases bail bail
New York 1391 94 6.8% 60 64%
Bronx 622 47 7.6% 28 60%
Queens 488 17 3.5% 14 82%
Total 2501 158 6.3% 102 65%
76. Welfare Commissioner Randolph E. Wise of Philadelphia has proposed a
similar program for the purpose of releasing on their own recognizance defendants
charged with minor crimes. Philadelphia Bulletin, Nov. 10, 1957, p. 23, col. 1.
The proposed New York statute is as follows: "Whenever bail is set for the
first time in a case, the probation officer of the court or other officer of the court
designated by the judges thereof for the purposes of conducting investigations and
making recommendations in accordance with this section shall be notified immediately.
If, within one week the defendant has not furnished bail, such officer shall investigate
the case to determine whether a lower amount would be sufficient or whether the
defendant should be released on his own recognizance, and if he so determines, he
shall recommend to a judge of the court having jurisdiction for trial of the case
that bail be set at such lower amount or that the defendant shall be released on his own
recognizance. The judge shall then order that bail be set at such lower amount or
that the defendant be released on his own recognizance, unless in his discretion he shall
continue the bail at the original amount. The district attorney need not be present
when the judge issues his order reducing bail or releasing the defendant on his own
recognizance under this section. No investigation shall be undertaken unless consent is
obtained from the defendant in question."
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At present there is some reconsideration of bail amount, in that
trial judges will entertain applications for reduction.77 This research
was unable to determine the total number of such applications but
only the number which were successful. 7s Table 10 shows that in the
2,501 cases in which bail was set, 158 defendants or 6.3 per cent were
successful in having the original bail amount reduced. It is noteworthy
that Queens County had only seventeen reductions out of 488 cases
in which bail was set, a ratio of only 3.5 per cent. This, in part, may
be a result of the practice in Queens whereby a defense counsel seeking
to have his client's bail reduced must first prevail on the assistant
district attorney in charge of bail, who, if he agrees to a reduction to a
certain amount, will not object when an application for the agreed
amount is made in court. In an interview, a Queens County judge
acknowledged the existence of this practice and stated that in court
the judge "almost completely" goes along with the district attorney's
recommendation. This has the effect of at least partially transferring
to the prosecutor the judicial duty of determining bail amount, and it
detracts from the appearance of fairness and independence which the
courts should strive to maintain. However, the smaller number of
reductions in Queens is also attributable to a lesser need for reductions
there. Queens defendants have a generally better ability to furnish bail
than defendants in the other counties and the bails there are somewhat
lower.79
Of the 158 cases in which the original amount of bail was reduced,
102 cases or 65 per cent were able to furnish the reduced amount. This
compares favorably with the 49 per cent able to furnish the original
bail amount.' Moreover, had these defendants not had their bails
reduced, they probably would have shown less than the average 49
per cent ability to furnish bail, since their applying for reductions in-
dicates they were unable to furnish the original amount. Thus, the
desirability of reconsidering bail amount is clear. The above proposal
would extend this practice to every case in which the defendant is
unable to furnish bail.
77. See People v. Ackerson, 166 Misc. 130, N.Y.S.2d 427 (Kings Co. 1937).
78. The docket books from which the data was taken do not record unsuccessful
applications. When a formal application is made, a record thereof will be filed with
the court papers with the clerk of court. However, since many applications are in-
formal, there is no record of them. Cf. note 38 supra.
79. See Table 2 and text at p. 708 supra.
80. See Table 2 upra.
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Bail Increases
TABLE 11. NUMBER OF BAIL CASES IN WHICH THE ORIGINAL BAIL
AMOUNT WAS LATER INCREASED, BY COUNTY
All cases Number
in which % of who % who
bail was total then posted posted
County set Increases cases bail bail
New York 1391 3 0.2% 0 0%
Bronx 622 26 4.2% 3 12%
Queens 488 4 0.8% 2 50%
Total 2501 33 1.3% 5 15%
In thirty-three of the 2501 cases in which bail was set, the district
attorney was successful in having the original bail amount increased
on the theory that the initial amount set was insufficient to compel
defendant's appearance at trial. Only five defendants whose bail was
increased, or 15 per cent, were able to furnish the increased amount of
bail. This is in sharp contrast to the 49 per cent able to post the
original amount set and the 65 per cent who were able to post reduced
amounts.81 Increasing a defendant's bail is very likely, therefore, to
sentence him to pre-trial imprisonment. Since this may become a
weapon of coercion for prosecutors to wield over uncooperative defend-
ants, judges should evaluate these applications with enlightened skep-
ticism. Unless the prosecutor can show that the defendant is likely to
fail to appear if allowed to remain free on his present bail, the bail should
not be increased.
ALTERNATIVE BAIL
The Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the defendant to post
with named officers 82 cash or government securities in lieu of bail.8
When the defendant appears at trial and his case is disposed of, he then
gets his cash or securities back from the city minus a small service
81. See Table 10 supra.
82. ".... with the county treasurer of the county in which he is held to answer
or to appear, or in the city of New York with the treasurer, or with the magistrate
by whom he is so held, or with any other justice or magistrate of the same court,
or with the clerk or deputy clerk of a court held by any such justice or magistrate, or
with the warden, deputy warden or keeper in.charge of the jail in which he so stands
committed .. ." N.Y. CoDm ClIM. PROC. § 586. See note 43 supra.
83. Cash "... . or a United States government bond or a United States treasury
certificate or note, or a corporate bond guaranteed unconditionally as to principal and
interest by the United States government or a bond of the state of New York or a
bond of the city of New York. .. ." N.Y. Co n CRIM. Paoc. § 586.
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charge. 4  The posting of cash as bail has two principal advantages:
first, it eliminates the services of the professional bondsman and possible
abuses that result therefrom and, secondly, it gives the defendant his
freedom without any actual loss of money except for the nominal service
charge. The obvious disadvantage is that very few defendants have
ready cash or high grade securities on hand equal to the amount of
their bail. Thus it would seem that only the wealthy defendant is able
to avail himself of the opportunity to post cash bail.
However, in order to extend to defendants of poor economic
status the opportunity to deposit cash the judges of the New York
counties have adopted a policy in some cases of setting an alternative
bail. For example, they will set bail at "$1,000 or $100 cash," meaning
that defendant may have a bondsman write a $1,000 bond for him,
or he may deposit $100 with an officer of the city, which amount will
be refunded after trial. This practice is, of course, extremely favorable
to the defendant who would have trouble raising collateral for a
bondsman.
TABLE 12. USE OF ALTERNATIVE ("CASH") BAIL, BY COUNTY
All cases Number Number 7o who
in which of % of who posted
bail was alternative total then posted bail
County set bails cases bail (cash) (cash)
New York 1391 25 1.8% 19 76%
Bronx 622 0 0%0 - -
Queens 488 1 0.2% 1 100%
Total 2501 26 1%10 20 77o
The use of alternative bail is set forth in Table 12. Alternative bail
was set in only twenty-six, or 1 per cent, of the 2501 cases in which
bail was set. Furthermore, no alternative bails were encountered in
the Bronx sample of 622 cases, and in Queens it was used only one
time. Perhaps accounting for its virtual non-use in these counties
is the attitude of some officials that it will add an extra administrative
burden to the courts. If alternative bails are not set by magistrates
because of the fear that magistrates or court clerks will become agencies
for the deposit of cash bail, this objection must fail because the duty
to accept such bail is imposed upon them by statute. Moreover, as a
practical matter, the detention prisons are currently accepting cash
deposits of bail with little or no difficulty.
84. The city is entitled to a fee of 2% of the amount of money or par value of the
bonds, notes or certificates. N.Y. COD Cam. PRoc. § 586.
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Of the twenty-six alternative bail cases encountered in this sample,
twenty defendants, or 77 per cent, were able to post the cash bail
amount. This compares quite favorably to the 49 per cent ability to
post bail " when it was expected that the defendant would have his bail
posted by a professional bondsman.
Why do judges use alternative bail in some cases and not in
others? If the judge is convinced that a given defendant needs little
compulsion to appear at trial, he usually sets either a low bail or an
alternative bail. There seems to be no apparent distinction by the
judges between cases in which a regular bail or an alternative bail
should be used. But it is important for the judge to realize that if he
is actually trying to give the defendant a "break," the alternative bail
is much more favorable to the defendant than the setting of a so-called
low bail. Sixty-eight of the eighty-nine prisoners interviewed were
asked whether they would have been able to post cash bail equal to
twice the amount that they would have been required to pay as the
bondsman's fee for the bail amount in their case. Thirty of the sixty-
eight unequivocally stated that they would have been able to raise this
amount, sixteen were uncertain, and twenty-two said that they definitely
were unable to. The forthrightness of the "uncertain" and negative
responses imparts some degree of credibility to the affirmative answers.
Thus, it is quite probable that a number of defendants who did not have
collateral for a bail bond or who preferred that family money be spent
in some other manner could have had pre-trial freedom had an alterna-
tive bail been used.
If the judge is satisfied that the defendant will appear at trial with
little financial compulsion necessary, alternative bail is recommended
as a method whereby the financial burden on a defendant is virtually
eliminated. A greater number of defendants will be able to raise this
type of bail and, more important, they (or their family) will get the
cash back when they come to trial.
RELEASE ON OWN RE cOGNIZANCE ("PAROLE")86
"In all cases where a defendant charged with a crime or offense
is before a city magistrate, and such magistrate is authorized to admit
85. Compare Table 2 supra, with Table 10 supra. More defendants raised alter-
native bail (77%) than bail which had been reduced (65%).
86. The term "release on own recognizance" as used herein means the release of
a defendant without bail prior to trial or sentencing. The term is used in an effort to
avoid the use of the term "parole" frequently used in this connection in New York,
which more commonly is used to describe the process of releasing a convicted de-
fendant from his prison sentence. The term should not be confused with "discharge
on own recognizance," a term used in New York City to denote a quasi-dismissal
of pending criminal charges by the prosecutor.
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him to bail,' the magistrate may, in his discretion parole the defendant
if reasonably satisfied that the defendant will appear when wanted." ss
Thus, the committing magistrate at the initial hearing has clear statu-
tory authority to release a defendant on his own recognizance.
TABLE 13. USE OF RELEASE ON OWN RECOGNIZANCE ("PAROLE")
BY MAGISTRATES IN ALL COUNTIES, BY SELECTED CRIMES 89
No.
Released
No. of on Own Per Cent
Crime Cases Recog. Released
Burglar's tools 43 6 14.0
Receiving stolen property 44 5 11.4
Grand larceny 607 38 6.3
Assault 389 16 4.1
Possession of dangerous weapon 99 4 4.0
Rape 131 5 3.8
Forgery 128 2 1.6
Narcotics 644 6 0.9
Robbery and burglary 889 6 0.7
Sex crimes, other than rape 64 0 0.0
Total 3,038 88 2.9
However, Table 13 shows that release on own recognizance was
used in only eighty-eight out of the 3038 cases shown on that table, a
ratio of but 2.9 per cent. A breakdown of the eighty-eight cases by
crime shows a bias toward the "white collar" crimes and away from
robbery and burglary. Whereas thirty-eight of the 607 grand larceny
defendants were released on their own recognizance, only six of the
889 robbery and burglary defendants were given that opportunity.90
87. See text at notes 27-30 supra for discussion of the authority of magistrates to
set bail, especially noting how this authority is limited by § 552 of the N.Y. CoDe CRIM.
PROC.
88. N.Y. CITY Calm. CTs. AcT § 103.
89. Table 11 presents releases on own recognizance as a percentage of the se-
lected felony cases studied since it could not be determined in which particular cases
the magistrate had authority to set bail or release. Since Table 1 shows that magis-
trates set bail in 76% of the cases studied, they therefore did have authority to release
on own recognizance in the vast majority of cases. It must also be noted that in
addition to the defendants initially released as shown in Table 13, there were twenty-
one more defendants released on their own recognizance after they had spent varying
times in prison or out on bail.
90. This tendency follows the pattern previously noted. "White collar" defendants
had bail set at a low amount more frequently than other defendants, and also demon-
strated a better ability to furnish bail at given amounts. See text at note 67 and
Table 5 supra.
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Perhaps the main reason militating against the widespread use
of release on own recognizance is that at the present time there is no
sanction if a defendant so released fails to appear. Unlike the bail
defendant, the defendant released on his own recognizance has no
financial interest at stake. And, although bail-jumping is a crime,91
it is not a crime to fail to appear when wanted after release on one's
own recognizance.
9 2
A New York County grand jury which conducted a three year
investigation into bail-setting malpractices and returned eleven indict-
ments against nine persons (seven bondsmen and two lawyers), recom-
mended that the courts release on their own recognizance "all defend-
ants who, consistent with the security of the community and the rights
of the defendant, should be at liberty while awaiting trial." 3 How-
ever, that recommendation was contingent upon enactment by the
state legislature of legislation making it a crime for a defendant to fail
to appear at trial after being released on his own recognizance. 4
Such legislation passed the New York State Senate in 1956 but
never reached the Assembly floor. In January 1957 the New York
State District Attorneys' Association urged passage of legislation
similar to the bill which passed the State Senate in 1956.9 The
reasons advanced by the District Attorneys' Association for favoring
this proposed legislation were: to encourage both the courts and prose-
cutors to make greater use of release on own recognizance instead of
bail; to relieve defendants of the economic hardships of bail; to diminish
contacts between defendants and occasional bondsmen-lawyer combina-
tions; and to alleviate the overcrowding of detention facilities.w These
reasons, advanced by prosecutors, emphasize the advantages of release
on own recognizance over bail. A statute making it a crime to fail to
appear at trial after a release on one's own recognizance should be
adopted in order to encourage the use of this method of release.
EFFECTS OF THE BAIL SYSTEM ON THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
The Remanded Defendant
The foregoing has indicated that the bail system, because of its
unrefined selection process, probably jails many defendants whose
91. N.Y. PiN. LAW § 1694-a.
92. Some judges have avoided the dilemma thus presented by use of a legal
technicality. They in effect release a defendant on his own recognizance by setting
a nominal bail of $1.00. Defendant gets pre-trial freedom with no economic sanction
but is faced with the crime of bail-jumping if he fails to appear at trial.
93. Report of the Third February 1954 Grand Jury to the Court of General
Sessions, County of New York, Pt. I, Dec. 1956 Term, at 5.
94. Ibid.
95. Nnw YORK SrATi DisICT ATrToRNSs, LroisLATIV PROPOSALS 5-7 (1957).
96. Id. at 5.
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appearance could be insured by low bails-in amounts they co'uld
afford to furnish-or who would appear in court if released on their
own recognizance.
This should be of concern to every citizen if only because of the
tax burden which results from unnecessary incarceration. Present
operating expenses of the New York City Department of Correction
are in excess of $4 per day per inmate in detention. For the fiscal
year 1954-55 the total operating cost of detention services provided
by the Department of Correction was $5,183,857.00.7 Furthermore,
since many of these prisoners are the only source of support for their
families, their presence in jail adds their dependents to the relief rolls
of the city.
The city's financial burden is susceptible of objective measurement.
But the disadvantages which may be experienced by the defendant in
detention are subtle and more difficult to ascertain. They are better
understood by a brief examination of the conditions which prevail in
the institutions where trial prisoners are detained.
Houses of Detention "I
In general, the rules enforced in adult detention centers are those
normally associated with maximum security penal institutions. In
the Manhattan House of Detention prisoners are locked in their cells
for approximately eighteen hours each day. When not locked in their
cells, they are ordinarily locked in the quadrant, a pen-like corridor on
which their cells front. In the Raymond Street Jail, prisoners are
locked in their cells at all times except for a one hour exercise period
each day. Members of the prisoner's immediate family and his lawyer
are the only persons permitted to visit him. When a family member
visits a prisoner, the prisoner is locked in a booth on the inside of a
brick wall. The visitor stands on the other side. They see each other
through a small glass panel and converse by telephone. Such visits are
permitted on the five week nights between 7 and 9 P.M. Counsel
visits are generally permitted between 9 A.M. and 4 P.M. during the
week, and on Saturday morning. During counsel visits, which are held
in a room designed for that purpose, an officer is required to be present.
All mail to and from prisoners is read by the officers. Prisoners are
not allowed to use the telephones personally; all messages are trans-
97. NYC DZ,'T or CoRzcnxoN, AqUAL RrPORT 64 (1955) (hereinafter cited as
RrWORT).
98. There are four houses of detention for adult males in New York City: one
each in Manhattan (The Tombs), The Bronx, Brooklyn (The Raymond Street Jail),
and Queens. In addition, there is a Women's House of Detention, located in Manhattan,
which serves the entire city, and the Brooklyn Adolescent Remand Shelter, which
houses male trial prisoners between the ages of 15 and 21 for the entire city.
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mitted by officers, who pare the messages down to their basic essentials.
These and other similar security measures result in a pattern of custody
which, paradoxically, is more restrictive than that ordinarily imposed
on convicted prisoners in sentence institutions. For example, at the
Rikers Island Penitentiary, a New York City sentence institution, many
prisoners have work assignments which permit them to be out-of-doors
a major portion of each day. They eat in mess halls instead of in cells
as do most inmates in detention. Sentenced prisoners who are assigned
to work in the kitchen, laundry, shops and in the cell blocks of the
detention centers enjoy a greater degree of freedom than do the inmates
awaiting trial. Administrative convenience is the primary reason for
these security measures. A constant stream of new prisoners flows
into the detention centers each day. The prison personnel know little
or nothing of their propensities."9 Because some may be problem pris-
oners, all are subjected to the security measures outlined above. Also
underlying their use are overcrowding, the constant turnover of prison
population, lack of sufficient adequately trained personnel, inadequate
physical plants and the fact that the detention centers, to be near the
courts, are located in the heart of the community where it is impossible
for them to be surrounded by a natural barrier, and where an escapee
may easily lose himself in the crowds. Overcrowding is particularly in
evidence at the Manhattan House of Detention, which, with 824 cells,
each designed for one man, currently houses a daily population in excess
of 1200 inmates.100 The daily turnover at that prison is sometimes as
high as 800 inmates per day.' Similar conditions are to be found in
all the detention centers.
Inadequate facilities account also for the fact that adults in
detention are afforded little opportunity to engage in recreational activi-
ties. 102 And, while trial prisoners can volunteer for work details in
the institution,0 3 only a few receive this opportunity. For most pris-
99. At the Brooklyn Adolescent Remand Shelter new arrivals are given psychologi-
cal tests designed to reveal their personality traits. Trained psychologists attempt to
segregate the "aggressives" from the "passives" on the basis of these tests, which
helps protect the individual from other inmates. This testing is one element of an
inmate rehabilitation program inaugurated on an experimental basis at this newly
constructed detention center.
100. RPORT at 91. On October 5, 1954 the daily census reached an all time high
of 1660 prisoners. Id. at 35 (1954).
101. See REIoRT at IV (1954).
102. Inmates at the Brooklyn Adolescent Remand Shelter enjoy a much greater
degree of freedom than do the adult prisoners in the other detention centers. In addi-
tion their time is largely occupied with various recreational activities. The institu-
tion has two libraries, two outdoor and one indoor gymnasiums and each floor has
two television sets.
103. State laws directing that prisoners be caused to work apply only to sen-
tenced prisoners in correction institutions and not to trial prisoners in detention. N.Y.
CORRECrIO LAW §§ 171, 175 (1944).
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oners, detention is a period of oppressive inactivity. The rehabilitation
and recreation programs at the New Brooklyn Adolescent Remand
Shelter are manifestations of a more enlightened custodial policy which
the Department of Correction is striving to introduce in all of the deten-
tion centers.
Trial Preparation
Incarceration under any circumstances imposes certain disad-
vantages in defending oneself against the prosecuting machinery of the
state. If the defendant had been employed, his income is cut off. In
many cases this will prevent his hiring private counsel, since most
criminal lawyers customarily require a substantial fee in advance of
undertaking the defense of a client. The defendant's opportunity to
obtain witnesses in his behalf is also greatly restricted. His attorney
is confronted with the task of seeking out and conferring with witnesses
without the benefit of the defendant's presence. Situations arise where
acquaintances of the defendant are reluctant to divulge information'
which might be helpful in the preparation of the case when questioned
by the attorney, a total stranger. These disadvantages are multiplied
when the defendant is imprisoned under the circumstances outlined
above. The prisoner's opportunity to communicate with the outside
world is trammelled at every turn by prison rules. Confidential com-
munication with his attorney is impaired by the constant presence of a
uniformed officer in the counsel room. 1 4 Furthermore, the frustration
and boredom which living under these conditions induces, must have
a deteriorative effect on the defendant's morale, which, in turn, may
affect his desire properly to defend himself, with his despair in some
cases resulting in a loss of faith in the judicial system and the entry of
a plea of guilty.
If detention populations continue to increase at their current rate,'05
any relaxation of the present high level of security would require con-
siderable expansion in physical plant and personnel. However, if the
courts were to impose lower bails and make greater use of alternative
bail and release on the defendant's recognizance, the number of persons
104. During the summer of 1957, defendant John Dioguardi, detained at the
Manhattan House of Detention during his trial, contended that he was unable properly
to confer with his lawyer in the prison's counsel room. Dioguardi claimed that he
and his counsel feared that the counsel room might be wired as it was in the case
of John "Socks" Lanza while he was detained in the Westchester County jail. Gen-
eral Sessions Judge Mullen honored Dioguardi's contention by allowing him to leave
the prison between the hours of 4 P.M. and 10 P.M. each day for the purpose of
conferring with his counsel. See N.Y. Times, June 26, 1957, p. 64, col. 1.
105. The average daily census of inmates in detention for the fiscal year 1953-54
was 2,845 and for 1954-55 it was 3,215, an increase of 13%. See RtpoRo at 17 (1954);
RxpoRT at 64.
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detained might be substantially reduced, thus allowing a minimum
security program to be instituted within the present operating budget.
Effects of Detention on the Outcome of the Case
That being in jail operates to the disadvantage of a defendant at
every stage of the proceedings is suggested by statistical comparisons
of bail and jail cases at the grand jury level, in terms of court dis-
positions and at sentencing. These statistics are presented with the
caveat that in addition to the one variable-whether or not the defendant
was in jail-that was isolated, other variables, such as the weight of
the evidence and the defendant's previous criminal record, are in-
capable of isolation. However, a system which does not fairly and
intelligently discriminate between which defendants shall be imprisoned
and which shall be allowed their freedom pending trial calls for cor-
rection regardless of whether incarceration has a demonstrably adverse
effect on the outcome of the case.
TABLE 14. GRAND Juay AcTioN o
Transferred to
Type of Total Dismissed Special Sessions' 0 7  Indicted
Case Number Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
Prison 1660 163 9.8 216 13.0 1281 72.2
Bail 602 144 23.9 78 13.0 380 63.1
TABLE 15. GUILTY PLEAS
10 8
Total Guilty Pleas
Type of Case Cases Number Per cent
Prison 1342 1203 89.6
Bail 698 521 74.6
106. This table covers all three counties. The prison cases are cases in which
the defendant was in prison at all times until disposition. The 612 bail cases shown
are made up of 518 cases in which the defendant was free on bail at all times
and 94 cases in which the defendant was released on his own recognizance at all
times. Not shown are cases which were initiated by indictment in the grand jury
rather than by complaint before a magistrate. In such cases it was not known
whether the defendant was at that time at large or in custody under other charges.
In addition, the number of cases initiated in the grand jury and transferred to spe-
cial sessions or not indicted was unknown.
107. In these cases the felony charge in the complaint is reduced to a misde-
meanor. Misdemeanors are prosecuted by way of- information in special sessions,
therefore no indictment is returned.
108. In this table and Table 16 the bail group is composed of defendants on
bail at all times or released on their own recognizance at all times and those in
prison ten days or less before being released on bail or their own recognizance. This
table includes cases originating in the grand jury as well as those initiated by com-
plaint before a magistrate.
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Table 14 shows that while the grand jury dismissed 23.9 per cent
of the bail cases, it dismissed only 9.8 per cent of the prison cases.
Similarly, as shown by Table 15, prison defendants have a greater
tendency to plead guilty than do bail cases, doing so in 89.6 per cent
of the cases as compared with 74.6 per cent in the bail group. At trial,
TABLE 16. TRIAL VERDICT 10 9
Type of Number Convictions Acquittals
Case of Trials Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
Prison 89 71 79.8 18 20.2
Bail 35 24 68.6 11 31.4
TAErL 17. SENTENCING 11 0
Total Sentenced to Sentenced to
Type of Number Suspended Sentence Penal Institution Tinw Already Served
Case Sentenced Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
Prison 1247 168 13.5 1047 83.9 32 2.6
Bail 616 334 542 277 45.0 5 0.8
prison defendants obtained acquittals in only 20.2 per cent of the cases,
while the bail defendants were acquitted in 31.4 per cent of the cases
as shown by Table 16. These figures tend to support the propositions
advanced earlier that jail in itself is likely to produce a guilty plea and
that incarceration impairs a defendant's ability to defend himself. But
the differences are not large and could be due in some measure to the
fact that magistrates often set higher bail, and thus keep the defendant
in jail, in cases where they realize that the weight of the evidence is
strongly against him. However, the sentencing difference is sub-
stantial. Table 17 shows that only 13.5 per cent of the prison defend-
ants received suspended sentences, as compared with 54.2 per cent of
the bail cases. Although the unknown factor of prior criminal record
may help to produce this difference, the size of the difference, and the
fact that the defendant who is in jail usually will have lost his job
and thus be deprived of a very strong argument for a suspended
sentence, an argument which the bail defendant may have, make it
difficult to escape the conclusion that incarceration disadvantages the
defendant at the sentencing stage.
Length of Detention
The length of time a defendant will spend in detention is influenced
by many factors. In cases dismissed by the grand jury the most
109. See note 108 supra.
110. The bail group shown on this table is composed of those defendants free
at all times on bail or on their own recognizance and those defendants who prior to
being released on bail or their own recognizance had been in prison thirty days or less.
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important factor is the speed with which the prosecutor presents the
case to the grand jury. That some preferende is given to prison cases
at this stage is shown by Table 18. 85.2 per cent of the grand jury
dismissals of prison cases occurred within the first 49 days following
the date of complaint, as compared with 64.8 per cent of the bail cases
and 46.4 per cent of the prison-bail cases. Nevertheless, it seems un-
fortunate that in 24 cases in the prison group, or 14.8 per cent, the
defendants spent from 50 to 149 days in jail before dismissal. Prob-
ably this was because prosecutors occasionally hold back weak cases
hoping to secure sufficient evidence to obtain an indictment.






















After indictment the district attorney takes his place as one of a
number of forces which determine how long a case will remain pending.
Docket congestion, dilatory tactics and bargaining by both sides each
play a part, varying in degree with each case. Although docket prefer-
ence ordinarily is not given to prison cases, the assistant district at-
torneys in each of the counties are instructed to attempt to expedite the
prison cases assigned them. Because of this, and because the defendant
in jail usually will not wish to delay his case, prison cases are disposed
of more rapidly than bail cases.







































111. Includes also defendants released on their own recognizance.
112. Includes cases where defendants spent some time in jail and were then
released on bail or on their own recognizance.
113. See note 111 supra.
114. See note 112 supra.
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TABLE 20. TIME FROM COMPLAINT TO COMPLETION OF TRIAL
Prison Cases Bail Cases 115 Prison-Bail Cases 116
Days Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
0-49 16 21.0% 1 5.9% 2 8.0%
50-99 24 31.6% 4 23.6% 5 20.0%
100-149 11 14.5%o 3 17.6% 5 20.0%
150-199 14 18.4% 6 35.3% 6 24.0%
200 and over 11 14.5% 3 17.6% 7 28.07
Totals 76 100% 17 100% 25 100%
Table 19 shows that 43.6 per cent of the guilty pleas in prison cases
are entered within 49 days and 82 per cent within 99 days. By
comparison, in bail cases 21.8 per cent are entered within 49 days and
49.6 per cent within 99 days and in prison-bail cases 22.7 per cent
within 49 days and 56.4 per cent within 99 days. Similarly, 52.6 per
cent of the trials of prison cases had been completed within 99 days as
compared with 29.5 per cent of the bail cases and 28 per cent of the
prison-bail cases as shown by Table 20. Present practices therefore
seem to be accomplishing the desirable purpose of expediting prison
cases over bail cases. However, it is not enough to do this if the
result still is that a substantial proportion of the defendants remain in
detention for an extremely long time, as is the case in New York. It
is no answer to this criticism to say that most of the defendants will
plead guilty or will be proven guilty and thus will have to serve time
in any event, and that their time in detention will be applied against
their sentences, or that in some eases the delay is due to maneuvering by
the defendant. The detention prisons were not designed for penal
service but merely for the temporary custody of trial prisoners. Con-
ditions in them are more oppressive than in sentence institutions. Even
if some prisoners do not find detention oppressive, they should not be
permitted to languish in detention centers under circumstances de-
moralizing to their habits of work and personal responsibility.
The solution to the problem of prolonged detention is the standard
one for court delay: more judges, full time courts, more careful scrutiny
of applications for continuances, whatever their source, coupled with a
vigorous prosecution which will, very soon after arrest, confront the
defendant with the alternative of pleading guilty or being tried.
115. See note 111 supra.
116. See note 112 supra.
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CONCLUSION
Detention is demoralizing and oppressive to the individual defend-
ant. It may also prejudice him in defending himself against the state.
Furthermore, it is wasteful of community resources. These factors
make it imperative that detention be employed as a means of com-
pelling appearance only when absolutely necessary. Most defendants
in detention are there because they are financially unable to furnish
bail. Because judges and magistrates who set bail usually lack knowl-
edge of the defendant's background, it seems quite likely that many
bails are set at levels higher than necessary to compel appearance.
Judges and magistrates should make every effort to avoid this. To
that end they should attempt to inform themselves as to the background
and financial status of the defendant and set a bail higher than he can
furnish only when there is strong reason to doubt that he will appear
if bail is set at an amount within his reach. They should be wary of
honoring applications for bail increases, and prosecutors should never
attempt to increase bail for tactical reasons but only when some newly
discovered fact makes it appear likely that the defendant would not
appear if bail were continued in its present amount. On the other hand,
judges and magistrates should look with favor upon applications to
reduce bail when supported by evidence of the defendant's reliability.
More liberal use should be made of release on one's own recognizance
and alternative bail. Bail should never be used for any purpose other
than to compel appearance.
To increase the availability of bail, the right to it should be ex-
tended to all defendants accused of non-capital crimes and present
limitations on the magistrates' power to admit to bail should be re-
moved. In addition, legislation should be adopted to require an in-
vestigation of the background and financial status of defendants unable
to furnish bail, in order to determine whether their bail amount should
be reduced. To implement the use of release on one's own recognizance,
failure to appear when so released should be made a crime. Court delay
should be investigated and its causes corrected to the end that those
defendants who must be held in detention remain there for as short a
time as possible.
